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1 Introduction
A common phenomenon in both industrialized and developing countries has
been the devolution of the internal scal system. Therefore, the eect of
scal decentralization on government policies and its consequent impacts on
economic growth has been a major concern of both academic researchers
and policy makers. However, existing empirical evidence on the relationship
between scal decentralization and growth are mixed. While some authors
nd a negative relationship (e.g., Danvoodi and Zou 1998, Zhang and Zou
1998), others nd a positive relationship or none at all (e.g., Lin and Liu
2000, Akai and Sakata 2002). 1
One of the signicant channels by which scal decentralization aects
growth is intense scal competition among sub-central governments. Bren-
man and Buchanan (1980) argued that competition for mobile factors of
production may help solve economic distortion induced by a self-interested
Leviathan government that abuses tax revenues for private gains. Owners
of production factors are sensitive to public sector ineciencies and allocate
their factors in jurisdictions where taxes are low and public services are good.
Because immobile voters suer from factor dislocation, they will become dis-
appointed with their government. Therefore, politicians, who want to be
re-elected, are forced to provide better conditions for mobile factors of pro-
duction by oering better services at lower taxes. Their discretion is reduced
and the Leviathan is tamed. Consequently, scal competition corrects public
sector ineciencies and may positively aect growth.
Studies such as those by Edwards and Keen (1996), Sato (2003), and
Arikan (2004) formalize this idea in the static scal competition model and
show two-competing inuences of scal competition on economic eciency.
Fiscal competition indeed increases the pressure on the state to use its tax
revenues more eciently. However, the increased mobility of the tax base in-
duces scal externalities and under-provision of public sector services. Con-
sequently, the overall impact of scal competition on economic eciency is
ambiguous. On the other hand, Wilson (2005) considers the situation where
the electorate or their representatives have substantial control over the tax
rate, but cannot adequately make the required innumerable specic expen-
diture decisions. Thus, they must delegate these decisions to self-interested
government bureaucrats, leaving the electorate with only rudimentary meth-
ods of control. In this case, Wilson (2005) shows that the eciency-enhancing
eect of scal competition dominates the eciency-deteriorating eect, and
1Feld et al. (2008) provides an excellent survey of the theoretical and empirical litera-
ture on scal decentralization and growth.
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thus scal competition improves economic eciency.
These existing studies are quite appealing and plausible. However, these
studies employ static models and thus cannot explicitly examine how in-
tense scal competition induced by scal decentralization inuences economic
growth. To my knowledge, the literature on scal competition and growth
is still limited. 2 In particular, few growth models focus on the role of
scal competition as a remedy for public sector ineciencies induced by a
self-interested Leviathan government. Rauscher (2005, 2007) authored two
exceptional studies. Rauscher (2005) follows the tradition of the optimum-
taxation-and-growth literature spurred by Judd (1985) and constructs an en-
dogenous growth model with scally competing Leviathans. Rauscher (2005)
also showed that the eect of intense scal competition on growth is gener-
ally ambiguous, and depends on the parameter value of the government's
elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. If the value of this parameter is
suciently greater than 1, the eect of intense scal competition on growth
is unambiguously negative. On the other hand, Rauscher (2007) constructs
an endogenous growth model with public sector innovation and scally com-
peting Leviathans. Raucher (2007) showed that scal competition reduces
the frequency of public sector innovation and thus lowers economic growth
for reasonable parameter values. These existing growth studies are quite
interesting and valuable. However, due to the complicated structures of
their models, it is sometimes dicult to understand the economic intuitions
behind their results. Moreover, it is sometimes hard to compare their im-
plications with those of existing static models. In this sense, these existing
growth models are not very tractable. Therefore, to complement existing
growth studies, this paper constructs a tractable growth model that enables
us to analytically examine how intense scal competition induced by scal
decentralization inuences economic growth. 3
This paper develops the Diamond (1965)-type two-period overlapping
generations model with Barro (1990)-type productive government expendi-
tures and Wilson (2005)-type scal competition models. Following Wilson
(2005), we consider the system of regions where tax rate and allocation of
government expenditure are chosen by separate decision-makers. We assume
that the tax rate is determined by the politicians who are elected at the begin-
ning of each period. The politicians in the legislature have substantial control
2This point is also stressed by Becker and Rauscher (2007). Their introduction provides
a recent survey of the theoretical literature on scal competition and growth.
3This paper is also related to a large body of literature on the eects of public infras-
tructure funding on capital accumulation and growth. Examples of work in this litera-
ture include Barro (1990), Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993), Glomm and Ravikumar
(1994).
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over tax rate. However, they cannot adequately handle the innumerable spe-
cic expenditure and regulatory decisions and must therefore delegate these
decisions to government bureaucrats. Thus, the allocation of government
expenditure is determined by government bureaucrats. However, as stressed
in the literature on the \leviathan government,? government bureaucrats
may not be perfect agents of politicians or voters. 4 Thus, given the choice
of tax rate by the politicians, self-interested government bureaucrats, who
are neither wholly selsh nor totally benevolent, determine their favored al-
location of government expenditures. Therefore, the politicians who wants
to maximize a weighted average utility of all voters in that period, decide
their tax rate explicitly accounting for the incentive eects that their taxes
create for expenditure decisions of government bureaucrats.
Under these public policy-making processes, this paper studies the impli-
cations of dierent scal regimes (i.e. centralized vs decentralized) for eco-
nomic growth and welfare in a simple dynamic model of a national economy
with many indentical and independent small regions. Then, we show that s-
cal decentralization is more desirable than scal centralization for economic
growth, when the degree of selshness of central government bureaucrats is
high, and the relative political power of the young to the old is low. We also
show that the growth-maximizing scal regime is also welfare-maximizing.
These results are explained as follows. In the decentralized regime, under
the small region assumption, local government bureaucrats in each region
behave competitively to attract capital into their region by allocating more
tax revenues for productive government expenditures. This expenditure com-
petition highers the growth rate in the decentralized regime relative to that
in the centralized regime where there are no scal competitions for capital
among local jurisdictions. However, politicians in each region also behaves
competitively to attract capital into their regions by lowering their tax rate.
This tax competition decreases total tax revenue and productive government
expenditures, and lowers the growth rate in the decentralized regime rela-
tive to that in the centralized regime. 5 Therefore, the overall growth eect
of scal decentralization depends on these two competing eects of scal
competitions. This paper shows that the share of tax revenue devoted to
productive government expenditure in the centralized regime is negatively
related to the degree of selshness of central government bureaucrats, and
the relative political power of the young to the old. These results suggest
4As stressed by Wilson (2005), this appears to be a good description of the situation in
most government bureaucracies because the electorate can easily monitor what happens
to tax rates but has a harder time monitoring the quality of dierent expenditures.
5Although this lower tax rate leads to higher capital accumulation through increased
wages, the former negative eect always dominates the latter positive eect.
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the lack of expenditure competition provides substantial negative impacts
upon per-capita output growth rate in the centralized regime, when the de-
gree of selshness of central government bureaucrats is high, and the relative
political power of the young to the old is low. Therefore, we can conrm
that scal decentralization is more desirable than scal centralization for
economic growth, when the degree of selshness of central government bu-
reaucrats is high, and the relative political power of the young to the old
is low. Moreover, we show that the welfare level of individuals is positively
related with growth rate of the economy. Therefore, we can conrm that the
growth-maximizing scal regime is also welfare-maximizing.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the case where
the eonomy employs decentralized scal regime. Section 3 examines the
case where the eonomy employs centralized scal regime. Section 4 presents
growth and welfare comparisons of these scal regimes. Finally, Section 5
provides concluding remarks.
2 Decentralized Regime
This paper considers a national economy with I  1 identical regions. We
rst consider the case where the economy employs the scal regime denoted
\decentralized regime". In this regime, each region decides independently on
the size and the composition of its respective public budget. In the present
model, we focus on the case where the economy consists of many identical
and independent jurisdictions (i.e. I is suciently large number). There-
fore, we employ the small region assumption under which each region faces
given rental price of capital. Each region i is populated by two-period lived
overlapping generations. The population size of each generation in this econ-
omy is L and remains constant over time (i.e. Lt = L holds for all t). All
households are assumed to be immobile, and each region i has Li;t = L=I
indentical young (old) agents.
2.1 Households
Agents derive utility from their own consumption in both youth and old age.
Thus, the lifetime utility of the agent in generation t in region i is expressed
as:
ui;t = (ci;t)
(di;t+1)
1 ; (1)
where ci;t and di;t+1 denote the consumption when young and old, respec-
tively, and  2 (0; 1) expresses the weight given to the consumption when
young.
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In youth, each agent is endowed with one unit of labor, supplies this labor
to local rms, and obtains wage income. An agent in generation t divides his
or her wage income wi;t between his or her own current consumption ci;t and
saving si;t. In old age, agents retire and consume their returns on savings
(1 + rt+1)st. Since agents invest their savings where they attain the highest
return, the same interest rate rt+1 must prevail in all region in equilibrium.
Thus, the lifetime budget constraints of the agent in generation t in region i
are:
ci;t + si;t = wi;t; (2)
di;t+1 = (1 + rt+1)si;t: (3)
By maximizing (1), subject to (2) and (3), we obtain the following saving
equation:
si;t = (1  )wi;t: (4)
The indirect utility function of the agent in generation t in region i is then
given by
vi;t =  (1 + rt+1)
1 wi;t; (5)
where    (1  )1 .
2.2 Firms and capital market
In each region i, competitive rms produces a single output. The produc-
tion function of a representative rm in region i is represented by Yi;t =
F (Ki;t; Li;t) = A(Ki;t)
(pi;tLi;t)
1 ;  2 (0; 1), where Yi;t, Ki;t, Li;t stand for
output, capital stock and labor, respectively, employed by the rm in region
i. As in Barro (1990), the productivity of worker is enhanced by per-capita
productive government expenditure, pi;t, where pi;t  Pi;tLi;t . Here, Pi;t stands
for the productive government expenditure provided by the local government
in region i. This production function can be written in an intensive form as
yi;t = F (ki;t; pi;t) = Ak

i;tp
1 
i;t , where yi;t  Yi;tLi;t , ki;t 
Ki;t
Li;t
.
Capital is freely moblile across regions, which requires the net of tax
return of capital to be equal for all regions. We assume that each local
government levies a proportional tax i;t on the total revenue of the rm in
each region. Thus, denoting the rental price of capital as t, the per-capita
capital demanded in region i is determined by
t = (1  i;t)Fk(ki;t; pi;t); 8i: (6)
Solving (6) for ki;t yields the per-capita capital demand function k(t; pi;t; i;t),
with
@ki;t
@t
= 1
(1 i;t)Fkk < 0,
@ki;t
@pi;t
=  Fkp
Fkk
> 0, and
@ki;t
@i;t
=   Fk
(1 i;t)Fkk < 0.
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Assuming that capital depreciates fully, an arbitrage condition t = 1 + rt
holds because the capital market is competitive. Additionally, the wage rate
in region i, wi;t, is given by
wi;t = (1  i;t)F (ki;t; pi;t)  tki;t: (7)
The total capital endowment in this economy in period t is given by Kt.
Thus capital allocations in period t must satisfy
PI
i=1 ki;tLi;t = Kt. Noting
Li;t =
L
I
, this capital endowment condition is rewritten as
IX
i=1
ki;t = Ikt; (8)
where kt  KtL .
2.3 Policy-making processes
Following Wilson (2005), we consider the system of regions where tax rate
and allocation of government expenditure are chosen by separate decision-
makers. We assume that the tax rate is determined by the politicians who
are elected at the beginning of each period t. The politicians in the legisla-
ture have substantial control over tax rate. However, they cannot adequately
handle the innumerable specic expenditure and regulatory decisions that af-
fect the tax base and must therefore delegate these decisions to government
bureaucrats. Thus, we assume that the allocation of government expendi-
ture is determined by government bureaucrats who gain their power through
delegation from elected politicians. However, as stressed in the literature
on the \leviathan government,? government bureaucrats may not be per-
fect agents of politicians or voters. Simply put, we assume that government
bureaucrats are neither wholly selsh nor totally benevolent, but that gov-
ernment bureaucrats are concerned about both their own welfare (obtained
from corrupt earnings) and their voters' welfare.
At the beginning of each period t, the tax rate i;t is determined within
a probabilistic voting framework (See, e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987).
In this framework, political platforms in period t in region i simply maxi-
mize a weighted average utility of voters in period t in region i. Thus, the
equilibrium tax policy maximizes a political objective function, given by:
Vi;t = ln(vi;t) + (1  )ln(vi;t 1); (9)
where
vi;t =  (t+1)
1 wi;t;
7
and
vi;t 1 = (ci;t 1)(tsi;t 1)1 :
From (5), vi;t and vi;t 1 express the welfare level of the young (i.e., generation
t), and the old (i.e., generation t 1) in period t in region i, respectively, and
 2 [0; 1] expresses the relative political power of the young. In this model,
the population size of the young L
I
in period t is equal to that of the old
L
I
. Thus, the parameter  simply expresses the relative political bargaining
power of the young caused by factors other than its population size.
Given the tax choices made by politicians, government bureaucrats in re-
gion i choose their level of productive government expenditures. The govern-
ment bureaucrats' objective in the present model is to maximize a weighted
sum of the utility obtained from corrupt earnings and politician's objective
function Vi;t dened in (9). The objective function is thus given by:
Wi;t =  ln(zi;t) + (1   )[ln(vi;t) + (1  )ln(vi;t 1)]; (10)
where zi;t is the part of the government's budget not spent on productive
public expenditures or corrupt earnings, expressed on a per-capita basis. We
interpret that zi;t includes any unproductive government expenditure which
benets government bureaucrats only, and does not benets others residents.
 2 [0; 1] expresses the weight given to corrupt earnings. A larger  implies
are less benevolent or more selsh.
Additionally, the budget constraint that local government bureaucrats in
region i face is given by:
pi;t + zi;t = i;tF (ki;t; pi;t): (11)
In the following, our analysis focus on the case where complete elimination
of zi;t is impossible. The part of governemnet budget is spent unproductively
due to some technical reasons. We specify the maximum attainable share
of tax revenue devoted to productive government expenditure as  2 (0; 1).
Thus the technical constraint for pi;t is given by
0  pi;t  i;tF (ki;t; pi;t): (12)
We assume that the value of  is suciently large enough and almost equals to
1. This assumption is restrictive but simplies the following analysis greatly.
2.4 Government bureaucrats
Under these public policy-making processes, we rst analyze the behavior of
local government bureaucrats, given tax choices made by politicians. Local
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government bureaucrats are assumed to have no control over their taxes i;t.
However, as expected from (10) with
@ki;t
@pi;t
> 0, they can increase their tax
revenue through their choice of productive government expenditures pi;t by
attracting capital ki;t into their regions. Since we employ the small region
assumption, local government bureaucrats in each region i consider the rental
price of capital t as given.
6 Thus, given the tax choices i;t made by
politicians and the rental price of capital t, local government bureaucrats
choose their level of pi;t to maximize (10), subject to (6), (7), (11), (12), and
ki;t = k(t; pi;t; i;t). Then, we obtain:
pi;t = i;tF (ki;t; pi;t);
= 
1
 (i;t)
1
A
1
ki;t:
(13)
Appendix A explains the derivations of (13). Equation (13) implies that
the maximum attainable share of tax revenue are devoted to the productive
government expenditure, although local government bureaucrats are con-
cerned about their corrupt earnings. This somewhat counter-intuitive result
is derived from intense expenditure competition for capital among local ju-
risdictions. In the small region case, local government bureaucrats in each
region behave competitively to attract capital into their region by increasing
their level of productive government expenditure. This intense expenditure
competition among local jurisdictions generate externalities under regional
capital mobility, increasing the local government bureaucrats' marginal value
of productive government expenditure relative to corrupt earnings. Conse-
quently, the maximum attainable share of tax revenue are devoted to the
productive government expenditure.
2.5 Politicians
Next, we analyze the behavior of politicians. Politicians in region i decide
their taxes i;t by explicitly accounting for the incentive eects that their
taxes create for the expenditure decisions of local government bureaucrats.
The respose function of local government bureaucrats is given by (13). Since
we employ the small region assumption, the politicians in region i also con-
sider the rental price of capital t as given. Thus, given the rental price of
6We also assume that local government bureaucrats and politicians take the rental price
of capital in the next period t+1 as given. Thus local government bureaucrats (politicians)
decide their level of pi;t (i;t) without accounting for the eects that their choice of pi;t
(i;t) inuence the evolutions of capital. This assumption is also restrictive, but simplies
our analysis greatly.
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capital t, politicians in region i choose their level of i;t as to maximize (9),
subject to (6),(7), (11), (13) and ki;t = k(t; pi;t; i;t). Then, we obtain:
i;t =
1  
1 + 
 D; (14)
Appendix B explains the derivations of (14). In the small region case, the
politicians in region i also behave competitively to attract capital ki;t into
their region by lowering their level of tax rate. The equilibrium tax rate D
in (14) is obtained as a result of this intense tax competitions among local
jurisdictions. We will explain it rigorously later by comparing the result of
decentralized regime with that of centralized regime.
2.6 Growth and welfare
The market clearing condition for capital in this economy is given by Kt+1 =PI
i=1 si;tLi;t. Since we assume indentical regions, every local governments
choose the same tax rates (i.e. i;t = t), and the same level of productive
government expenditure (i.e. pi;t = pt). Consequently, the per-capita capital,
wage rate, and savings must be the same in all regions (i.e. ki;t = kt, wi;t = wt,
and si;t = st). Therefore, capital market equilibrium condition is rewiritten
as
kt+1 = st: (15)
By substituing (4),(6),(7), (13), (14) into (15), the gross per-capita output
growth rate GD in the decentralized regime is described by:
kt+1
kt
= (1  )(1  )A 1T (D) 1   GD: (16)
where
T (D)  (1  D)(D) 1  :
Moreover, by substituting (6), (7),(13), (14) and 1+ rt = t into (5), and re-
arranging it with (16), the indirect utility function of the agent in generation
t, vDt , in the decentralized regime is given by:
vt = (G
D)t+2 k0  vDt ; (17)
where   
1  (

1 )
1 , and k0 expresses the initial capital labor ratio. 7
From (17), we can see that the welfare level of the agent in generation t, vt,
is positively related with economic growth GD.
7The utility function of the initial old agent (i.e. generation -1) is given by ui; 1 = d
1 
i;0 .
The budget constraint is d0 = (1 + r0)k0. Thus, by substituting (6), (13), (14) into u 1,
and rearranging it with (16), we obtain the indirect utility function of the initial old agent,
vD 1, in the decentralized regime: v
D
 1 = [
1
1 

1 G
Dk0]1  .
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3 Centralized Regime
In this section, we consider the case where the economy employs the scal
system denoted \centralized regime". In this regime, a central government
determines whole physcal policies of all regions. However, since we consider
a economy with identical regions, the centralized regime simply corresponds
to the one region economy with L identical young (old) agents (i.e. I = 1).
Therefore, there are no scal competitions for capital among local jurisdic-
tions. In addition, even in the system of central government, the tax rate is
assumed to be determined by the politicians, and allocation of government
expenditure is assumed to be determined by central government bureaucrats.
Since descriptions of households' as well as rms' behaivors are the same as
those in the previous section, the following subsections mainly describe the
behaviors of central government.
3.1 Government bureaucrats
We rst analyze the behavior of central government bureaucrats. In the
centralized regime, central government bureaucrats consider the per-capita
capital kt as given (i.e. no scal competitions for capital among local juris-
dictions). In addition, given t = (1  t)Fk(kt; pt), they can aect the rental
price of capital t through their choice of pt.
8 9
Therefore, given the tax choices t made by politicians and the per-capita
capital kt, central government bureaucrats choose their level of pt to maximize
(10), subject to (6), (7), (11) and (12). Then, we obtain:
pt = 	( ; )tF (kt; pt);
= [	( ; )]
1
 (t)
1
A
1
kt:
(18)
where
	( ; )

=  if 	^( ; )  ;
= 	^( ; ) if 	^( ; )  ;
8For simplicity of the following analyses, we assume that central government bureau-
crats and politicians take the rental price of capital in the next period t+1 as a given.
They do not account for whether their choice of pt and t aects the rental price of capital
in the next period through its impact on kt+1. Analogous simplications are employed in
many previous studies such as, for example, Gradstein and Kaganovich (2003) and Ono
(2005).
9In appendix G, we also examine the case where central governement bureaucrats
(politicians in cnetral government) consider the rental price of capital t as given. Then,
we can easily conrm that the main implication of this paper does not alter signicantly,
even if we employ these alternative assumptions.
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and
	^( ; )   (1  ) + (1   )(1  )[+ (1  )(1  )]
 + (1   )(1  )[+ (1  )(1  )] :
Appendix C explains the derivations of (18). In the following analyses, we
focus on the parameter  , which expresses the degree of selshness of central
government bureaucrats and the parameter , which expresses the political
bargaining power of the young relative to the old. To stress these parameters,
we dene 	 as 	( ; ). 	( ; ) expresses the share of tax revenue devoted
to productive government expenditure in the centralized regime, and satis-
es 	( ; )  . Since 	( ; )  , the share of productive government
expenditure in the centralized regime is lower than that in the decentralized
regime. Therefore, lack of expenditure competition for capital in the central-
ized regime induces larger unproductive government expenditure by central
government bureaucrats.
Moreover, 	( ; ) satises the following properties: @	
@ 
 0 and @	
@
 0.
@	
@ 
 0 simply indicates that an increase in the degree of selshness of central
government bureaucrats  decreases the share of tax revenue devoted to
productive government expenditure. @	
@
 0 indicates that an increase in
the relative political power of the young relative to the old  increases the
share of tax revenue devoted to productive government expenditure. From
(10), we can see that an increase in wt increases the welfare of the young in
period t (i.e. generation t), whereas the increase in t increases the welfare
of the old in period t (i.e. generation t   1). Noting these features, from
(6), (7) and (9), we can conrm that the marginal welfare eect of pt on the
young agent is larger than the marginal welfare eect of pt on the old agent
(i.e. @ln(vt)
@pt
> @ln(vt 1)
@pt
for 8pt). 10 Therefore, when  > 0, the higher the
relative political power of the young becomes, the higher the share of tax
revenue devoted to the productive government expenditure becomes.
3.2 Politicians
Next, we analyze the behavior of politicians. Politicians decide their taxes by
explicitly accounting for the incentive eects that their taxes create for the
expenditure decisions of central government bureaucrats. In the centralized
regime, politicians also consider the per-capita capital kt as given, and can
aect the rental price of capital t through their choice of t using t =
(1   t)Fk(kt; pt). Therefore, given the per-capita capital kt , politicians
10Given the rental price of capital in the next period t+1 and savings in the previous
period st 1, using (7),(8),(10) and (13), we obtain @lnvt@pt = (1  t)(1 ) 1pt and
@lnvt 1
@pt
=
(1  )(1  t)(1  ) 1pt . Therefore, we can conrm @lnvt@pt >
@lnvt 1
@pt
for 8pt.
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choose their level of t as to maximize (9), subject to (6),(7), (11) and (13).
Then, we obtain:
i;t = 1    C ; (19)
Appendix D explains the derivations of (19). From (14) and (19), the equi-
librium tax rate in the decentralized regime D becomes lower than that in
the centralized regime C (i.e. D < C). Tax competition for capital among
local jurisdictions lowers the equilibrium tax rate in the decentralized regime,
because politicians in each region tries to attract capital into their region by
lowering their tax rate i;t.
3.3 Growth and welfare
The market clearing condition for capital in this economy is given by Kt+1 =
stL. Thus, capital market equilibrium condition is rewiritten as (15). By sub-
stituing (4),(6),(7), (18), (19) into (15), the gross per-capita output growth
rate GC in the centralized regime is described by:
kt+1
kt
= (1  )(1  )A 1T (C)[	( ; )] 1   GC : (20)
where
T (C)  (1  C)(C) 1  :
Moreover, by substituting (6), (7),(18), (19) and 1+ rt = t into (5), and re-
arranging it with (20), the indirect utility function of the agent in generation
t, vCt , in the centralized regime is given by:
vt = (G
C)t+2 k0  vCt ; (21)
where   
1  (

1 )
1 , and k0 expresses the initial capital labor ratio. 11
From (21), we can see that the welfare level of the agent in generation t, vt,
is again positively related with economic growth GC .
4 Comparison of scal regimes
In this section, we compare the dierent scal regimes by analyzing growth
rate and welfare in the decentralized regime and those in the centralized
regime.
11The indirect utility function of the initial old agent, vC 1, in the centralized regime is
given by vC 1 = [
1
1 

1 G
Ck0]1  .
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4.1 Growth
By utilizing (16) and (20), we rst compare the growth rate in the decentral-
ized regime with that in the centralized regime .
In the decentralized regime, as discussed in section 2-4, the maximum
attainable sahre of tax revenue are devoted to the productive government
expenditure due to the expenditure competition for capital among local ju-
risdictions. However, in the centralized regime, the share of productive gov-
ernment expenditure decreases due to the lack of expenditure competition for
capital. Therefore, expenditure competition highers the growth rate in the
decentralized regime GD relative to that in the centralized regime GC . The
comparison of 
1 
 in (16) and [	( ; )]
1 
 in (20) expresses these growth
eects of expenditure competition. Since 	( ; ) < , we can conrm that
expenditure competition highers the growth rate in the decentralized regime
relative to that in the centralized regime GC .
Moreover, as discussed in section 3-1, the tax rate in the decentralized
regime D becomes lower than that in the centralized regime C due to
the tax competition for capital among local jurisdictions. This decrease in
the tax rate  provides two competing impacts on per-capita output growth
rate in the decentralized regime. First, the decrease in  increases the wage
rate from (7), enhancing capital accumulation and thus positively aecting
per-capita output growth rate in the decentralized regime. We denote this
as the positive growth eect of tax competition. However, the decrease in
 decreases the tax revenue from (11), decreasing productive government
expenditure, and thus negatively aecting per-capita output growth rate in
the decentralized regime. We denote this as the negative growth eect of tax
competition. The comparison of T (D) in (16) and T (C) in (20) expresses
these growth eects of tax competition. From the properties of T (), we
can easily conrm that the relation T (D) < T (C) holds. 12 This result
implies that the negative growth eect of tax competition always dominates
the positive growth eect, and thus tax competition lowers the growth rate
in the decentralized regime relative to that in the centralized regime.
These results suggest that expenditure competition highers the growth
rate in the decentralized regime relative to that in the centralized regime,
whereas the tax competition lowers the growth rate in the decentralized
regime relative to that in the centralized regime. Therefore, whether GD >
GC or GD < GC holds depends upon these two competing eects of scal
12By dierentiating T () = (1 )() 1  with respect to  , we can see that the relations
@T
@ > 0 8 2 (0; 1  ) and @T@ < 0 8 2 (1  ; 1) hold. In addition, from (14) and (19),
the relation D < C = 1    holds. Therefore, we can easily conrm the relation
T (D) < T (C) holds.
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competitions.
From (16) and (20), we have the following relationship
GD  GC,[T (
D)
T (C)
]

1   	( ; )

; (22)
where
[
T (D)
T (C)
]

1  =
2

1 
(1 + )
1
1 
:
The larger value of [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  implies that the negative eect on GD due
to the tax competition becomes smaller, whereas the smaller value of 	( ;)

implies that the positive eect on GD due to the expenditure competition
becomes larger. Therefore, suppose the latter positive eect dominates the
former negative eect (i.e. [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  > 	( ;)

), scal decentralization is
more desirable than scal centralization for economic growth.
From (22), comparing the growth rate in the decentralized regime with
that in the centralized regime, we obtain the following proposition 1. In the
proposition 1, we denote the value of  () which satises 	( ;)

= [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1 
as  ^ (^).
Proposition 1 . Comparing the growth rate in the decentralized regime with
that in the centralized regime, the following statements hold:
(1) When [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  < 	(1;)

,
i) suppose  2 [0;  ^), then the relation GC > GD holds.
ii) suppose  2 ( ^; 1], then the relation GC < GD holds.
(2) When 	( ;0)

< [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  < 	( ;1)

,
i) suppose  2 [0; ^), then the relation GC < GD holds.
ii) suppose  2 (^; 1], then the relation GC > GD holds.
Proof of Proposition 1 is shown in Appendix E and F. Proposition 1-1
indicates that growth rate in the decentralized regime is higher (lower) than
that in the centralized regime, if the degree of selshness  of central govern-
ment bureaucrats is suciently high (low) to satisfy  2 ( ^; 1] ( 2 [0;  ^)).
As stated in section 3-1, the share of tax revenue devoted to productive gov-
ernment expenditure 	( ; ) in the centralized regime is negatively related
to the degree of selshness  of central government bureaucrats. Therefore,
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when the value of  is large (small), the share of tax revenue devoted to the
productive government expenditure becomes low (high). Conseuquently, the
lack of expenditure competition provides substantial (unsubstantial) negative
impacts upon per-capita output growth rate GC in the centralized regime.
Therefore, the relation GC < GD (GC > GD) is more likely to hold, when
the value of  is suciently large (small).
Proposition 1-2 indicates that growth rate in the decentralized regime is
higher (lower) than that in the centralized regime, if the relative political
power of the young to the old is suciently low (high) to satisfy  2 [0; ^)
( 2 (^; 1]). As stated in section 3-1, the share of tax revenue devoted
to productive government expenditure 	( ; ) in the centralized regime is
positively related to the relative political power of the young . Therefore,
when the value of  is small (large), the share of tax revenue devoted to the
productive government expenditure becomes low (high). Conseuquently, the
lack of expenditure competition provides substantial (unsubstantial) negative
impacts upon per-capita output growth rate GC in the centralized regime.
Therefore, the relation GC < GD (GC > GD) is more likely to hold, when
the value of  is suciently small (large).
These results of proposition 1 suggest that scal decentralization is more
desirable than scal centralization for economic growth, when the degree
of selshness of central government bureaucrats  is high, and the relative
political power of the young to the old  is low, because the share of tax rev-
enue devoted to productive government expenditure is low in the centralized
regime. Numerical simulation result in Figure 3 conrms these results. 13 In
the gure, the value of lambda expresses the value of , and the value of psi
expresses the value of  . Then, the region where the value of z-axes is 1 (0)
expresses the parameters in which the relation GC < GD (GC > GD) holds.
We can conrm that the relation GC < GD is likely to hold when the value
of  is high and the value of  is low.
4.2 Welfare
Next, by utilizing (17) and (21), we briey compare the welfare level of indi-
viduals in the decentralized regime with that in the centralized regime. As
discussed in section 3 and 4, vDt in (17) (v
C
t in (21)) expresses the welfare
level of individuals in generation t which is attained when the economy em-
ploys the decentralized regime in period 0 and maintains it for all subsequent
13We set the baseline parameterization of the model as follows;  = 0:35,  = 0:6,
 = 0:9, A=4.5. Then, given these values, we increase the value of  and  from 0 to 1 in
increments of 0.01.
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periods. From (17) and (21), we have the following relationship
vDt  vCt ,GD  GC : (23)
From (23), comparing the welfare level of individuals in generation t in
the decentralized regime with that in the centralized regime, we obtain the
following proposition 2.
Proposition 2 . The growth-maximizing scal regime is also welfare-maximizing
for any generation.
Proposition 2 is easily conrmed from (23). Therefore, together with
the reuslts of Proposition 1, we can nd that scal decentralization is more
desirable than scal centralization for welfare of individuals, when the degree
of selshness of central government bureaucrats is high, and the relative
political power of the youg to the old is low.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studyed the implications of dierent scal regimes (i.e. central-
ized vs decentralized) for economic growth and welfare. We showed that s-
cal decentralization is more desirable than scal centralization for economic
growth, when the degree of selshness of central government bureaucrats is
high, and the relative political power of the young to the old is low. We also
showed that the growth-maximizing scal regime is also welfare-maximizing.
In this paper, we employ several restrictive assumptions or specications
to obtain intuitive analytical results. In particular, politicians and bureau-
crats decide their level of tax and public expenditure without accounting for
the eects that their choices inuence the evolutions of capital. However,
to understand the relationship between scal decentralization and growth in
more depth, this assumption might be too restrictive. Therefore, extending
our analysis using dynamic game framework must be a promising direction
for future research.
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Appendix A: Derivations of (13)
By substituting (9) into (10), the objective function of local government
bureaucrats is rewritten as:
Wi;t =  ln(zi;t) + (1   )[ln(wi;t) + (1  )(1  )ln(t)] + (1   )
where   ln[ (t+1)1 ] + (1  )ln[(ci;t 1)(si;t 1)1 ]. Then, by substi-
tuting (6), (7) and (11) into the above equation, and dierentiating it with
pi;t and noting ki;t = k(t; pi;t; i;t), the rst order condition for pi;t is given
by:
@Wi;t
@zi;t
[(i;tFp   1) + i;tFk @ki;t
@pi;t
] +
@Wi;t
@wi;t
(1  i;t)Fp  0
where
@Wi;t
@zi;t
=  
i;tF pi;t ,
@Wi;t
@wi;t
= (1  )
wi;t
,
@ki;t
@pi;t
=  Fkp
Fkk
from (6), and strict in-
equality holds when pi;t = i;tF (ki;t; pi;t). Noting F (ki;t; pi;t) = A(ki;t)
(pi;t)
1 ,
the rst order condition for pi;t is rewritten as:
@Wi;t
@zi;t
[i;tF   pi;t] + @Wi;t
@wi;t
(1  i;t)(1  )F  0
where
@Wi;t
@wi;t
= (1  )
(1 i;t)(1 )F . Then, rearranging above equation, we nd
1
pi;t
[ + (1   )] > 0:
Thus, noting the constraint for pi;t in (12), we obtain equation (13) as a
corner solution.
Appendix B: Derivations of (14)
Equation (9) is rewritten as follows.
Vi;t = ln(wi;t) + (1  )(1  )ln(t) + 
where   ln[ (t+1)1 ] + (1  )ln[(ci;t 1)(si;t 1)1 ]. Then, by substi-
tuting (6), (7) and (13) into the above equation and dierentiating it with
i;t and noting ki;t = k(t; pi;t; i;t), the rst order condition for i;t is given
by:
@Vi;t
@wi;t
[ F + (1  i;t)Fpdpi;t
di;t
] = 0
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where
@Vi;t
@wi;t
= 
wi;t
,
dpi;t
di;t
 @pi;t
@i;t
+
@pi;t
@ki;t
@ki;t
@i;t
and
@ki;t
@i;t
= Fk
(1 i;t)Fkk from (6). Here
dpi;t
di;t
is derived from (13). Then, noting F (ki;t; pi;t) = A(ki;t)
(pi;t)
1 , the
rst order condition for i;t is rewritten as:
@Vi;t
@wi;t
[ F + (1  i;t)(1  )F 1
pi;t
dpi;t
di;t
] = 0
where
@Vi;t
@wi;t
= 
(1 i;t)(1 )F and
dpi;t
di;t
= 1

pi;t
i;t
(1   
1 
i;t
1 i;t ). By substituting
dpi;t
di;t
into the above equation, we obtain:
@Vi;t
@wi;t
f 1 + 1  i;t
i;t
1  

[1  
1  
i;t
1  i;t ]g = 0
Then, rearranging above equation, we obtain equation (14).
Appendix C: Derivations of (18)
By substituting (9) into (10), the objective function of central government
bureaucrats is rewritten as:
Wt =  lnzt + (1   )[lnwt + (1  )(1  )lnt] + (1   )
where   ln[ (t+1)1 ] + (1  )ln[(ct 1)(st 1)1 ]. Then, by substitut-
ing (7) and (11) into the above equation, and dierentiating it with pt and
noting (6), the rst order condition for pt is given by:
@Wt
@zt
(tFp   1) + @Wt
@wt
(1  t)(Fp   Fkpkt) + @Wt
@t
(1  t)Fkp  0;
where @Wt
@zt
=  
tF pt ,
@Wt
@wt
= (1  )
wt
, @Wt
@t
= (1  )(1 )(1 )
t
, and strict inequality
holds when pi;t = i;tF (ki;t; pi;t). Noting F (kt; pt) = A(kt)
(pt)
1 , the rst
order condition for pt is rewritten as:
@Wt
@zt
[t(1  )F   pt] + @Wt
@wt
(1  t)(1  )2F + @Wt
@t
(1  t)(1  )Fk  0
where @Wt
@wt
= (1  )
(1 t)(1 )F and
@Wt
@t
= (1  )(1 )(1 )
(1 t)Fk . Then, rearranging above
equation, we obtain equation (18).
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Appendix D: Derivations of (19)
Equation (9) is rewritten as follows.
Vt = lnwt + (1  )(1  )lnt +
where   ln (t+1)1 +(1 )ln[(ct 1)(st 1)1 ]. Then, by substituting
(7) and (18) into the above equation and dierentiating it with t, the rst
order condition for t is given by:
@Vt
@wt
[ (F  Fkkt)+ (1  t)(Fp Fkpkt)@pt
@t
] +
@Vt
@t
[ Fk+(1  t)Fkp@pt
@t
] = 0
where @Vt
@wt
= 
wt
and @Vt
@t
= (1 )(1 )
t
. In addition, @pt
@t
is derived from (18)
and satises @pt
@t
= 1

pt
t
. Then, noting F (kt; pt) = A(kt)
(pt)
1 , the rst
order condition for t is rewritten as:
[(1  ) @Vt
@wt
F +
@Vt
@t
Fk]( 1 + 1  t
t
1  

) = 0
where @Vt
@wt
= 
(1 t)(1 )F and
@Vt
@t
= (1 )(1 )
(1 t)Fk Then, rearranging above equa-
tion, we obtain equation (19).
Appendix E: Proof of Proposition 1-1
From (18), the relations @	
@ 
< 0, 	(0;)

= 1 and 	(1;)

= 1 

hold. In addition,
since 0 < T (D) < T (C), we nd [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  2 (0; 1). Therefore,suppose
the assumption [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  < 	(1;)

holds, we can depict the relationship
between 	( ;)

and [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  as shown in Figure 1. From Figure 1, we can
conrm that the inequality [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  < 	( ;)

([T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  > 	( ;)

) holds
when  2 [0;  ^) ( 2 ( ^; 1]). Therefore, noting (21), we can conrm that
the proposition 1-1 holds.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 1-2
From (18), the relations @	
@
> 0, 	( ;0)

= 1

(1 )[ +(1  )(1 )]
 +(1  )(1 )(1 ) and
	( ;1)

=
1

(1 )
 +(1  )(1 ) hold. In addition, since 0 < T (
D) < T (C), we nd [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  2
(0; 1). Therefore, suppose the assumption 	( ;0)

< [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  < 	( ;1)

holds,
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we can depict the relationship between 	( ;)

and [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  as shown in Fig-
ure 2. From Figure 2, we can conrm that the inequality [T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  > 	( ;)

([T (
D)
T (C)
]

1  < 	( ;)

) holds when  2 [0; ^) ( 2 (^; 1]). Therefore, noting
(21), we can conrm that the proposition 1-2 holds.
Appendix G: Footenote 9
In this appendix, we briey examine the case where central government bu-
reaucrats (politicians in central government) consider the retal price of capital
as t as given. In this case, the equilibrium productive government expendi-
ture is given by
pt = 	( ; )tF (kt; pt);
= [	( ; )]
1
 (t)
1
A
1
kt;
where
	( ; )

=  if 	^( ; )  ;
= 	^( ; ) if 	^( ; )  ;
and
	^( ; )   (1  ) + (1   )
 + (1   ) :
In addition, equilibrium tax rate is given by
t = 1    C :
Therefore, we can easily conrm that the main implication of this paper does
not alter signicantly, even if we employ these alternative assumptions.
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[T (
D)
T (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]

1 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
GC > GD GC < GD
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
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Figure 1: Threshold value of  
24
[T (
D)
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C)
]

1 

0 1^
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
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
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
Figure 2: Threshold value of 
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